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Introduction 
 
Global health issues, and especially global health risks, have risen to increasing prominence on 
the international political agenda in the last two decades. The harbinger for this change was the 
emergence of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s, a novel communicable disease which at its height led to 
the deaths of more than 2 million people a year, and risked the stability of states and the 
security of regions. Since then, outbreaks of other infectious diseases, such as SARS (2002-3), 
MERS (2012), Ebola (2014-15) and Zika (2016), recurrent alarms about influenza pandemics 
such as avian flu (2005) and swine flu (2009), and concerns over antimicrobial resistance (AMR) 
have all appeared prominently on the international agenda. The United Nations General 
Assembly has held several high-level meetings on health issues since 2000, including on HIV, 
non-communicable diseases, the Ebola response, and AMR. The HIV/AIDS pandemic and the 
Ebola outbreak even triggered resolutions by the United National Security Council, which 
declared that these outbreaks may constitute risks to stability as well as national and 
international peace and security. Furthermore, the rise of global health issues on the 
international political agenda has led to the emergence of numerous new programs and 
organizations at the global level, within the UN system (such as UNAIDS and the WHO Global 
Outbreak Alert and Response Network), and outside the UN, notably in the form of 
public-private partnerships, such as the Global Fund and GAVI. 
 
1 
The rise of global health on the international political agenda was accompanied and, indeed, 
driven by the rise of a new narrative: health is global. In the era of globalisation, the argument 
goes, health problems are increasingly global and require global responses. Infectious disease 
outbreaks in particular were newly identified as being a global risk, given their potentially rapid 
spread between states and across continents. In 2002-3, the SARS outbreak demonstrated how 
novel viruses could spread across continents within weeks. Crucially it also led to the World 
Health Organization taking a proactive leadership role, prompting David Fidler to comment that 
health had moved into a ‘post-Westphalian’ phase.  Although Fidler’s claim was at best 1
premature,  the term ‘global health’ drew new political attention to, and implied the need for new 2
political initiatives concerning, health. Not least, this discursive shift allowed health risks to be 
constructed as ​shared ​ between and across states. The potential of infectious diseases to 
spread quickly across the globe meant that, for the first time in more than a generation, high 
income OECD countries appeared to be vulnerable to outbreaks of infectious disease. Hence, 
infectious diseases with pandemic potential and also the rise of antimicrobial resistance have 
been portrayed as threats to national security in several OECD countries. These issues are also 
increasingly presented as ‘global risks’, potentially damaging the global economy and thereby 
global stability and security.  
 
At the same time, the rise of global health has brought with it the rise of a global health ​politics​ . 
While the HIV/AIDS pandemic was portrayed as a risk to global stability and security, it also 
revealed stark differences in how vulnerable different populations are in becoming infected and 
being able to access treatment. Different interests, perspectives and values have also become 
apparent with regard to which health issues to prioritise in global health governance, with many 
high-income countries focussing on infectious diseases with pandemic potential and - more 
recently - AMR; and many low-income countries being particularly concerned with strengthening 
local health systems and the many ‘neglected’ diseases that kill thousands of poor people every 
day. Furthermore, the rise of global health politics is also linked to the growing 
acknowledgement that health issues have implications​ beyond ​ health, so that different interests 
and values now appear in debates on global health issues beyond the physical and mental 
well-being of individuals and communities. Most significantly perhaps, global health issues have 
1 David P. Fidler, ​SARS, Governance and the Globalization of Disease ​ (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004). 
2 See Adam Kamradt-Scott, ​Managing Global Health Security ​ (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015 
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been presented as threats to national and international security and to macroeconomic growth. 
In addition, ‘global health’ problems are intrinsically linked to issues of international 
development, human rights and global commerce and trade. Global health therefore is not a silo 
- as multiple studies have shown, global health has become part of the business of 
organizations and institutions outside the narrowly-defined health field. In January 2000, for 
example, at its first meeting of the new millennium, the UN Security Council addressed the 
international security implications of HIV and AIDS; later that year it passed Resolution 1308, 
principally concerning the risks posed by the disease to peacekeeping missions but also 
“[s]tressing that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security”3
. In 2014, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2177, identifying the West African Ebola 
outbreak as a “threat to international peace and security”. In 2000, the Millennium Development 
Goals recognized health, and especially high incidence communicable diseases such as HIV 
and malaria, as risks to sustainable development and human rights; in 2001, the Report of the 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, chaired by Jeffrey D. Sachs, identified poor health 
as a risk to macroeconomic growth. Methodologies and theories from outside the health sector 
(including security and economics) are now regularly applied to health. Moreover, as Stefan 
Elbe has argued,  ideas from health have in turn permeated thinking in other sectors: medical 4
and public health communities are important participants in biodefense programs, notably in the 
US, and WHO is regularly involved in debates on global trade and intellectual property 
protection. 
 
While the rise of global health politics therefore is intrinsically linked to the rise of global health, 
there is a notable tension between these two phenomena. Politics sits uneasily with both the 
emphasis on the global nature of health problems and the tradition of public health as a 
technical field grounded in positivism and scientific rationality. The notion of ‘global health’ tends 
to obscure the fact that some populations are more likely to be affected by health problems than 
others, that some health issues are more relevant in some countries than in others, and that 
policy responses tend to benefit some people more than others. Furthermore, the field of global 
health and global health governance is dominated by policymakers and experts with a 
background in public health, epidemiology and medicine, and therefore permeated by an ethos 
3 United Nations Security Council [UNSC] Resolution 1308, 17 July 2000. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm  
4 Stefan Elbe, ​Security and Global Health ​ (Cambridge: Polity, 2010) 
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of positivism and scientific rationality. In this tradition, rigorous observation, quality data and the 
application of reason can identify the best response to a given problem, an approach seen 
across health - from the treatment of disease to the allocation of resources. The idea is that 
there is an optimal solution to a given problem, which can be arrived at through the use of a 
robust empirical methodology. Failures to resolve global health problems - such as the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, the West African Ebola crisis and Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) - are 
therefore ascribed either to poor data, weak reasoning, inadequate resources or the 
interference in this process by partial forces (often decried as ‘political’ interference). Change, in 
this scenario, will be driven by better data, improved processes, greater investment, and better 
technology.  
 
This paper however takes a different approach. We argue that understanding and driving 
change in global health requires a shift away from a positivist approach to one which embraces 
the legitimacy of different interests. To explain this shift we apply insights from two theories: 
framing and the sociology of risk. Drawing upon established uses by social constructivists, 
framing has been used in a limited manner in global health, principally as a means of 
understanding agenda setting and governance.  Framing is understood as being when an issue 5
is presented in such a way as to tie it into a broader set of ideas about the world, and through 
this gain influence and policy purchase. Gitlin, for example, defines frames as ‘persistent 
patterns of cognition, interpretation and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion, by 
which symbol-handlers routinely organise discourse’ (1980, p. 7). They may be deployed and 
promoted by the range of stakeholders (including transnational advocacy groups, international 
organisations and epistemic communities) and used by them as a tool of persuasion to generate 
or legitimise specific pathways of response. They may be deployed to call attention to an issue, 
influence other actors’ perceptions of their own interests, or convince them of the 
legitimacy/appropriateness of the advocate’s preferred policy response. When they are 
successful in doing so, the chosen frame ‘resonates with public understandings, and are 
adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues’, and actors will be likely to 
modify their behaviour accordingly (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 897).  
5 For example, ​Shiffman; Labonte; ​Colin McInnes and Kelley Lee eds, ‘Framing global health 
governance’, ​Global Public Health​  7:S2 (2012); and Colin McInnes, Adam Kamradt-Scott, Kelley Lee, Anne 
Roemer-Mahler, Simon Rushton and Owain Williams, ​The Transformation of Global Health Governance 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
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We link frames to risk in two particular ways: first, how framing global health in terms of ‘risk’ 
opens up a new, political discourse; and second, how different actors may frame risks from 
health issues differently, leading to competing understandings of the nature of the problem and 
the means of resolution.  We begin by discussing the policy implications of the ‘global risk’ 
frame in global health, notably with regard to infectious disease pandemics, and draw on 
insights from sociological theories of risk to discuss how this framing can diffuse politics in two 
ways. First, the global risk frame emphasises the potentially disastrous consequences of these 
risks, thereby making it difficult to oppose action to prevent such disaster without appearing 
negligent. Second, the risk frame reinforces the narrative of globality by stressing the universal 
impact of potential disaster. Yet, the global risk frame is inherently political because it promotes 
policy responses that benefit some more than others. We then move to analyse how different 
frames have been used in an actual response to a pandemic, the Ebola outbreak in West Africa 
in 2014-15. We suggest that a variety of frames exist which construct risk differently, each of 
which may be privileged by different actors not least because of their sectoral interests and 
organisational culture. We then discuss how three of the key organisations involved in the global 
Ebola response, WHO, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and the UN Security Council, framed 
the problem in different ways, thereby promoting different pathways of response. We conclude 
by arguing that, although the concept of  ‘risk’ in health carries a depoliticising tone, in global 
health it has opened up the requirement for a greater political sensitivity. Politics is inherent in 
global health, and needs to be accommodated rather than avoided. 
 
Global health risks: unpredictable, unavoidable and potentially catastrophic 
This section discusses how health problems, especially outbreaks of infectious diseases and 
pandemics, have increasingly been framed as ‘global risks’, and how this in turn has affected 
responses. The term ‘risk’ has, of course, a long history in medicine and public health. As a key 
concept in statistics to calculate the probability of an event happening, the concept of risk is at 
the heart of modern science, including the medical sciences and public health. Terms such as 
‘risk factor’ and ‘mortality risk’, which estimate the likelihood of individuals acquiring a disease 
and dying from a diseases respectively, are commonly used in medical and public health 
discourse. We suggest, however, that the framing of certain health issues as ‘global risks’ 
follows a different logic. Portraying a health issue as a ‘global risk’ is not a statistical exercise; 
rather it constructs the issue as a policy problem in a particular manner and promotes a 
5 
particular set of policy responses. Moreover, it ties global health into a wider narrative 
concerning societal vulnerability in the contemporary, globalised world.  
 
In the last decade, we have seen the emergence of a discourse that portrays certain global 
health issues, notably infectious disease pandemics and AMR, as global health risks. This 
discourse is manifest in a range of policy documents and reports and several institutions that 
have recently been created. The Commission on a ​Global Health Risk ​ Framework for the Future 
[emphasis by the authors] starts from the premise that  “Infectious diseases remain one of the 
biggest risks facing humankind” . The World Bank’s ​World Development Report​  2014 states that 6
pandemics are one of the key risks facing the world today, and the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Risk Report 2016​  discusses pandemics as one of the global risks ‘in focus’. As 
mentioned above, the term risk has a long tradition in medicine and public health as a technical 
term for the calculation of probabilities. While this use of the term ‘risk’ remains predominant 
among health experts, we observe something different happening in the emerging discourse on 
global health risks: the term ‘risk’ here is used to refer to events that are considered 
in​ calculable. For instance, the Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future 
states: “Although there are enormous uncertainties in modeling the risks and potential impact of 
infectious disease crises, the case is compelling no matter how it is calculated” . Bill Gates, 7
co-Chair of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which is one of the key players in global 
health, argues that “[e]ven though we can't compute the odds for threats like bioterrorism or a 
pandemic, it’s important to have the right people worrying about them and taking steps to 
minimize their likelihood and potential impact” . By highlighting the difficulty or even impossibility 8
of assessing the likelihood of an event occurring, the technical meaning of the term ‘risk’ as 
statistical likelihood, as used conventionally in medicine and public health, is turned on its head.  
 
The use of the term risk to refer to events that are considered incalculable and unpredictable is 
not confined to the field of global health. Rather, a risk-discourse has emerged in a wide range 
of global debates. The World Economic Forum publishes an annual ​Global Risk Report​ , now in 
its 12th edition, which provides an annual list of top 5 global risks; the OECD published a report 
in 2003 on ​Emerging Systemic Risks in the 21st Century​ , which proposed a framework for 
6 The Commission on a Global Health Risk​ ​ Framework for the Future 2016: The neglected dimension of 
global security: a framework to counter infectious disease crises. National Academy of Sciences: 1. 
7 Ibd.: 2. 
8 Olga Jonas 2014: Pandemics. Background Paper to the World Development Report 2014: X. 
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action on risks posed by natural disasters, industrial accidents, infectious diseases, terrorism 
and food safety; the World Bank’s ​World Development Report 2014​  entitled ‘Risk and 
Opportunity’ discusses risk management as a powerful tool for development; and in 2015, the 
UN General Assembly endorsed the ​Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction​ , which 
constituted a ​shift in terminology from disaster management to disaster ​risk​  management, and 
also includes strong focus on health. Finally, the term ‘systemic risk’ became common parlance 
in the context of the financial crisis 2008.  
 
The perception that the world faces a number of risks with potentially disastrous consequences 
has also been the focus of scholarly debates, driven most prominently by the works of Ulrich 
Beck and Anthony Giddens . ​These authors are concerned with new forms of risk that modern 9
societies face, notably those created by industrialisation and the rise of technologies. These 
risks are man-made and can be distinguished from the natural ‘dangers’ that have always 
threatened men, such as earthquakes, floods and disease. Furthermore, Beck not only 
distinguishes between risk and danger, but also between man-made risks that society and 
governments have found ways to cope with, such as accidents in factories or traffic, and those 
large-scale problems that can arise from nuclear power, genetic engineering or climate change, 
and which call into question the capacity of modern societies to deal with. ​In addition, Beck 
highlights the impact of globalisation on the quality of these risks. These new man-made risks 
have potentially enormous repercussions not only because they are inherently large-scale but 
also because they are inherently global. The consequences of chemical and nuclear accidents 
transcend national borders as much as those of genetic engineering in an era where food 
production is globally interconnected. The link to the current discourse on global health risks is 
evident and summarised in the much repeated statements that ‘germs know no borders’ and 
that in an era of accelerated movement of goods and people ‘health is global’.  
 
The perception of infectious disease outbreaks as global risks therefore feeds into a general 
sense of vulnerability of modern societies to disasters. This sense of vulnerability is linked 
mainly to the potential ​impact​  of an event - not its likelihood. The report of the Commission on a 
Global Health Risk Framework for the Future illustrates this: “There are very few threats that can 
9 Ulrich Beck 1992: Risk society: toward a new modernity. New York: Sage; Ulrich Beck 2009: World at risk, 
Cambridge: Policy; Anthony Giddens 2000: Runaway world: how globalisation is reshaping our lives. New 
York: Routledge. 
7 
compare with infectious diseases in terms of their potential to result in catastrophic loss of life]”10
. And Bill Gates highlights that “bioterrorism and pandemics are the only threats I can foresee 
that could kill over a billion people” . The World Economic Forum’s ​Global Risk Reports​  have 11
ranked health issues among the top 5 global risks in terms of impact; they have not made it into 
the top 5 in terms of likelihood. 
 
In this framing, the potentially catastrophic impact of pandemics is intrinsically linked to 
globalisation. First, increased travel and trade has made it easier for pathogens to spread 
across the globe. Second, the potentially catastrophic impact results from an increasingly 
interconnected world, including increasingly interconnected “systems on which society depends”
, such as economic and financial systems, energy, communication, transport and trade. In an 12
interconnected world, the argument goes, any disruption to critical systems is likely to have 
global repercussions. Finally, the framing of pandemics as global risks carries an aura of 
inevitability: New pathogens with pandemic potential emerge all the time through natural 
evolution. The systems that can massively accelerate their dissemination across the globe 
cannot be disrupted, however, because these systems are of vital importance for the functioning 
of modern society . Hence, it is the combination of natural evolution and a social order based 13
on global infrastructures, that makes infectious disease outbreaks appear as potentially 
catastrophic, yet unpredictable and unavoidable.  
 
Responding to global health risks through better preparedness 
If this is the perception of the problem, what does an appropriate response look like? Interesting 
insights into this question come from a body of work on US security policy that focuses on the 
emergence of a new set of organisations and strategies for the protection of transport and 
energy infrastructures and economic and financial systems  . The US government perceives 14
10 The Commission on a Global Health Risk​ ​ Framework for the Future 2016: The neglected dimension of 
global security: a framework to counter infectious disease crises. National Academy of Sciences: v. 
11 Jonas 2015: X. 
12 Beck 1992: 30. 
13 Elbe, Stefan​, ​Roemer-Mahler, Anne​ and ​Long, Christopher​ 2014: ​Securing circulation pharmaceutically: 
antiviral stockpiling and pandemic preparedness in the European Union.​ Security Dialogue, 45 (5). pp. 
440-457 
14 Andrew Lakoff 2007: Preparing for the next emergency, Public Culture 19(2): 247-271; Andrew Lakoff 
2008: The generic biothreat, or, How we became unprepared. Cultural Anthropology 23(3): 299-423. Andrew 
Lakoff 2013: A dearth in numbers: the actuary and the sentinel in global public health, LIMN 3: 41-45. 
Andrew Lakoff and Stephen Collier, eds, 2008. Biosecurity interventions: global health and security in 
question. New York: Columbia. 
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the threat to these ‘vital systems’ as emanating from events like terrorist attacks, pandemics and 
natural disasters. Because these events are deemed unavoidable, conventional security policies 
that focus on prevention do not work. The US government therefore adopted a strategy focused 
on mitigating the impact of such events by becoming more prepared for their occurrence. 
Hence, preparedness emerges as the key rationale for how to respond to incalculable, yet 
unavoidable and potentially disastrous risk. The basis for acting on risks framed as 
unpredictable yet unavoidable and potentially catastrophic is not to calculate what is more or 
less likely to happen, but to be prepared for whatever happens.  
 
The language and rationality of preparedness is evident also in the international debate on 
global risks, including global health risks. For instance, the Commission on a Global Health Risk 
Framework for the Future states: “The global community spends relatively little to protect 
populations from from the risks of pandemics. Compared with other high-profile threats to 
human and economic security - such as war, terrorism, nuclear disasters and financial crises - 
we are underinvested and underprepared” . The Global Health Security Agenda, a US-led 15
international initiative of more than 50 countries, argues in a recent report that “[t]he enormous 
costs of pandemics can be averted with strategic investment in capacity building and 
preparedness” . The background paper on Pandemics to the World Bank’s World Development 16
Report 2014 states: “Active promotion of whole-of-society resilience and pandemic 
preparedness can benefit countries by reducing not only pandemic impact, but also the costs of 
other disasters and major crises . Furthermore, the language of preparedness has also made it 17
into the names of newly created institutions, such as the Coalition on Epidemic Preparedness 
Innovations (CEPI) set up in the aftermath of the Ebola outbreak. In an article in the medical 
journal The Lancet, CEPI founders underscore the rationale behind the preparedness response: 
“Although no-one knows what the next outbreak will be we must develop the required arsenal 
now” . In 2011, WHO member states launched a Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 18
Framework, which lays out rules for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines 
developed from these materials. The European Commission launched a Global Research 
15 The Commission on a Global Health Risk​ ​ Framework for the Future 2016: The neglected dimension of 
global security: a framework to counter infectious disease crises. National Academy of Sciences: 1. 
16 GHSA 2016: Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda: Progress and early impact from U.S. 
investment, p. 1 
https://www.ghsagenda.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/ghsa-legacy-report.pdf?sfvrsn=12 
17 Jonas 2014: 7. 
18 Brende et al 2017: 233. 
9 
Collaboration for Infectious Disease Preparedness (GloPID-R) in 2013 as a ready-to-go platform 
for pharmaceutical research coordination in the event of a public health emergency. 
 
The rationality of preparedness is manifest not only in the language around global health risks, 
but also in the instruments and tools of policy responses. A key instrument are surveillance 
systems to to pick up signs of an outbreak early and monitor the spread of diseases. In the last 
two decades, many countries have strengthened their infectious disease surveillance systems, 
especially in OECD countries . In 2005, ​the revision of the International Health Regulations 19
(2005) expanded systematic surveillance at the global level. WHO member states are now 
required to implement early-warning systems and laboratories that can detect potential threats 
and report outbreaks to WHO. Many global health initiatives working with the global health risks 
framework emphasise the importance of the IHR to strengthen pandemic preparedness. 
Another set of governance mechanisms that is commonly promoted to strengthen pandemic 
preparedness is the development and stockpiling of medicines and vaccines for infectious 
diseases with pandemic potential. To that end, WHO has developed a pharmaceutical “R&D 
Preparedness” strategy, the R&D Blueprin​t ​. Starting from the premise that “Infectious disease 20
epidemics pose a clear and ongoing risk to global health, security and economic prospects”  21
the Blueprint is a framework to accelerate the development of drugs and vaccines for infectious 
diseases with pandemic potential by agreeing on priority pathogens, identifying financing 
mechanisms, providing coordination and technical guidance. CEPI, an alliance of governments, 
pharmaceutical companies, philanthropic organisations and academics, was set up to “pursue a 
proactive (“just-in-case”) and accelerated (“just-in-time”)”  ​strategy to develop vaccines against 22
infectious diseases with pandemic potential. National governments, especially in Europe and 
North America have created stockpiles of medicines and vaccines for potential infectious 
disease pandemics. The EU agreed on a joint-purchasing approach for medicines and vaccines 
required for such events.  
 
19 See, for example, M Stoto 2012: The effectiveness of U.S. public health surveillance systems for 
situationual awareness during the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic, PLoS One (August): 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040984 
20 WHO 2016: An R&D Blueprint for action to prevent epidemics. Plan of action. Geneva: 4. 
21 WHO 2016: Blueprint: 5. 
22 CEPI 2016: New vaccines for a safer world: 1. 
http://cepi.net/sites/default/files/CEPI_2pager_03_Feb_17.pdf 
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Finally, the rationality of preparedness as response to global health risks is manifest in the 
development of procedures, legislation and financing mechanisms that can be activated in an 
emergency event. Such procedures have been created for how the development and use of 
relevant medicines and vaccines an be accelerated. As the World Economic Forum’s ​Global 
Risk Report 2016 ​ argues: “Preparedness and response measures range from the behavioural… 
to the need to invest in diagnostic, drug and vaccine R&D and in its enabling environment, 
especially advancing a regulatory framework . At the national level, legislation is most 23
advanced in the US notably with the creation of the Animal Efficacy Rule and the Emergency 
Use Authorization.  The Animal Efficacy Rule responds to the problem that many diseases that 
are considered health security threats occur only rarely – or not at all – in nature. Medicines and 
vaccines against such threats can often not be approved on the basis of human clinical trials. 
The reason for this is that disease outbreaks may be too short or involve too few people for 
large-scale clinical testing to be organised, and deliberately exposing humans to pathogens 
merely for the purpose of pharmaceutical development is considered unethical. Under the 
Animal Efficacy Rule the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) can approve pharmaceuticals 
based on efficacy studies conducted with animal models rather than on human clinical trials. 
The product’s safety, however, has to be demonstrated in human studies.  The EUA was 
established as part of the Project Bioshield Act and the Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Reauthorization Act (2013). It can provide authorisation for the use of 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices that have not yet been fully tested for safety and efficacy. 
There is no equivalent to the animal rule in other countries or at the international level, but some 
countries and international organisations have prepared emergency use authorisation 
procedures as part of pandemic preparedness strategies. For instance, the European Medicines 
Agency has initiated procedures for accelerating the availability of vaccines during an influenza 
pandemic, including a ‘mock-up procedure’ whereby a vaccine can be authorised on the basis 
of the virus strain that might cause a pandemic – before the pandemic has actually occurred.. In 
the wake of the Ebola outbreak, WHO ​created Emergency Use Assessment and Listing 
procedures that were used for Ebola diagnostics and are currently being used also for the first 
Ebola vaccine. In addition financing facilities have been created to strengthen global pandemic 
preparedness. In 2015, WHO member states set up a Contingency Fund for Emergencies to 
23 WEF 2016: 7. 
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fund initial response activities, and a year later, the World Bank launched​ t​he Pandemic 
Emergency Financing Facility to “create the first-ever insurance market for pandemic risk” . 24
 
Global health risks: a moral imperative for global action? 
The framing of pandemics as a global risk shapes the perception of the problem as 
unpredictable yet unavoidable and potentially catastrophic, and sets the path to the policy 
response of pandemic preparedness. Moreover, this frame generates a tone that seems to 
make it particularly suitable for global governance and global collective action . A key insight 25
from sociological theories of risk is that modern societies not only create new risks (by creating 
new technologies), but that they also want to control them. As Giddens writes​: ​“Risk is the 
mobilizing dynamic of a society bent on change, that wants to determine its own future rather 
than leaving it to religion, tradition, or the vagaries of nature” . Niklas Luhmann in his 26
sociological theory of risk finds that there is a common perception that “the future depends on 
decisions made in the present” . From this perspective, the future risk of disasters depends on 27
decisions that someone has made - or not made. If this is the case, “one can demand that such 
dangers be obviated” . Hence, with the perception that risks depend, at least partly, on human 28
decisions comes the expectation that decisions are made that minimise future risks. Inherent in 
the modern perception of risk, therefore, is a call to action.  
 
Yet, how to combine this call to action with a portrayal of risks as unpredictable? If we perceive 
risks as unpredictable we remove the rational calculation of relative likelihood and impact as the 
basis for decision-making. Then how do we decide about which risks to prioritise, which risks to 
act on and where to allocate finite resources? In the public and political debate on global health 
risks, the key rationale for decision-making and action is the potentially disastrous impact of a 
pandemic.  ​The Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future suggests that 29
24 World Bank 2016: World Bank Group launches groundbreaking financing facility to protect poorest 
countries against pandemics, Sendai, 21 May. Available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/05/21/world-bank-group-launches-groundbreaking-fin
ancing-facility-to-protect-poorest-countries-against-pandemics 
25 See also anthropological studies on risk as a manifestation of political tensions, e.g. Douglas; Nelkin? 
26 Giddens 2000: 42. 
27 Niklas Luhmann 1993: Risk: a sociological theory. Translated by Rhodes Barrett. Berling and New York: 
De Gruyter: X. 
28 Ibid. 
29 ​T​his rhetoric feeds into the sense of urgency and emergency that has been created through the framing of 
certain health issues as security threats. Several scholars have illustrated how the securitisation of health 
issues has created a certain “political modality” for dealing with health problems, an “emergency modality of 
12 
an annual commitment of $4.5 billion could significantly strengthen global pandemic 
preparedness. It then goes on to ask: “How does $4.5 billion per year stack up against the 
potential risks? The 1918 influenza pandemic killed approximately 50 million people (CDC, 
2014) and arguably as high as 100 million in 1918–1920 (Johnson and Mueller, 2002)” and 
“during the 21st century global pandemics could cost in excess of $6 trillion” (2015: 17; 18). 
CEPI, with its mission to develop vaccines against future pandemics, argues that “[i]nfectious 
disease epidemics … match wars and natural disasters in their capacity to endanger lives, 
disrupt societies and damage economies...Many of the epidemic diseases that we know pose 
the greatest threat to society could be prevented with vaccines. But very few vaccines against 
these threats have been developed to create proven medical products” . ​And the Global 30
Health Security Agenda points out that: “Experts estimated that the 2003 SARS outbreak cost 
the global economy between $30 billion and $40 billion in just 6 months. The next severe 
influenza pandemic, for example, could cost the world economy up to $6 trillion. The enormous 
costs of pandemics can be averted with strategic investment in capacity building and 
preparedness”.   31
 
By emphasising the potentially catastrophic impact of global health risks, this framing makes it 
difficult to oppose measures that could help mitigate or even prevent the catastrophe. Faced 
with potentially enormous losses not only in human lives but also in economic terms, “​[i]t is no 
longer possible to say, without exposing oneself to criticism, that according to the calculations, 
the risk is negligible” . In other words, faced with the potential enormity of the catastrophe, it is 32
difficult to argue that the resources should be spent on other things. Hence, the sense of fear 
and urgency created by this framing lifts the issue beyond the level of political conflict about 
different interests and perspectives. This dynamic resembles the effects that framing an issue 
intervention” (Lakoff and Collier 2008: ?) and a “World on Alert” (Weir and Mykhalovskiy XXXX) (see also 
Craig Calhoun). In particular, the rhetoric of urgency and emergency seems to promote governance 
responses that are short-term and focus on technological interventions, such as surveillance systems and 
pharmaceuticals, which are perceived as politically neutral and therefore supposedly more easily justified in 
international politics than social and economic interventions (Roemer-Mahler and Elbe 2016; Collier and 
Lakoff 2008; Calhoun XXXX). 
30 CEPI n.d. Mission. Available at: http://cepi.net/mission 
31 GHSA 2016: Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda: Progress and early impact from U.S. 
investment, p. 1 
https://www.ghsagenda.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/ghsa-legacy-report.pdf?sfvrsn=12 
32 ​ ​Chateauraynaud, Francis and Didier Torny. 2005. Mobiliser autour d’un risque. Des lanceurs aux 
porteurs alerte in Risques et crises alimentaires, C Lahellec (ed.), Lavoisier​,​  pp. 329-339. (p.4) 
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as a security threat has, and scholars of global health politics have used securitisation theory to 
tease out these effects when health issues such as HIV/AIDS and Ebola were portrayed as 
threats to national and international security . Furthermore, it has been argued that it is 33
precisely the move of lifting security debates out of the realm of normal politics that makes 
securitisation such an attractive strategy for actors who seek to mobilise resources and attention 
for an issue .  34
 
The risk-frame has, however, a significant advantage compared to the security-frame: The 
notion of security tends to be divisive as most people associate security with national interest. 
The term risk carries an aura of science, objectivity and neutrality and is therefore less obviously 
politically charged than the notion of security. The risk-frame is therefore more inclusive than the 
security-frame. This inclusive character is strengthened further by language that underscores 
the global nature of the impact: millions of lives lost globally, damages to the global gross 
domestic product (GDP), and the rapidity with which “​an airborne influenza virus could spread to 
all major global capitals within 60 days” ​. The inclusive character of framing health issues as 35
global risks is of particular relevance in the global political arena where the range of interests 
and perspectives - including on health - is wide, where cooperation is voluntary, and where 
persuasion can be a powerful tool to promote cooperation .  36
 
The risk-frame may seem particularly suitable for global governance and global collective action 
because it combines a moral imperative to act with a tone of neutrality and inclusiveness. Yet, it 
merely shuts out politics rather than remove it. ​In the aftermath of the Ebola outbreak, several 
reviews and lessons-learned reports were published , all of which highlighted the need to 37
strengthen local health systems in low- and middle-income countries. This would certainly 
benefit those people the most who are most likely to be mainly affected by a pandemic. Not only 
are pandemics most likely to spread first and foremost in poor countries, but stronger health 
systems would also help local populations in the absence of a pandemic by preventing 
33 references 
34 reference 
35 UN High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises 2016: Protecting humanity from future 
health crises. Advance unedited copy. 25 January. Available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/HLP/2016-02-05_Final_Report_Global_Response_to_Health_Crises.pdf 
36 A Betts 2009: Protection by Persuasion. Cornell. 
37 WHO 2015; Moon et al., 2015; UN Secretary General 2015; UN High-level Panel 2016. 
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thousands of deaths every day from already existing health threats. The focus of the 
preparedness agenda lies, however, with the establishment of logistical, financial and 
technological mechanisms requirement for early detection and containment. While this could 
certainly reduce the global impact of infectious diseases, it would do little to reduce the impact 
of infectious diseases in poor countries (MSF 2015). Despite the tone of neutrality and 
inclusiveness, framing pandemics as global risks privileges the interests of some over those of 
others. 
 
Framing risks in global health  
This section discusses a different form of framing: how global health has been framed as 
different types of risk. Framing has been used by a small number of studies to explain why 
some global health issues achieve greater prominence than others.  These studies point out 38
that levels of mortality and morbidity do not always offer a satisfactory explanation for which 
health issues appear on international agendas and which do not. The appearance of the Zika 
virus in South America in 2015-16, for example, received widespread attention and was 
declared a Public Health Emergency of international Concern by the WHO (only the fourth 
health emergency to reach this highest level of alert), despite no one having died from the 
disease; while the 750,000 infants who die ​each year ​ of diarrhoeal disease barely warrants a 
mention on international agenda. Instead these studies suggest that what matters is how health 
issues are presented, or ‘framed’ to resonate with powerful actors’ interests. Thus Owain D. 
Williams argues that economic framings for patent protection tapped into sectoral interests 
which limited the ability of pharmaceutical companies to produce cheap and affordable generic 
medicines needed to save lives. Reubi goes further, suggesting that successfully framing 
tobacco control as a human right allowed activists to then ‘tap into the powerful, judicial 
monitoring and enforceabiity mechanisms that make up international human rights’ .  39
 
In the literature on global health, framing has therefore been principally used to explore how 
advocates persuade powerful actors to take positions and use their influence on a particular 
health issue (agenda setting). But framing may also be used to explain or legitimise the actions 
of these powerful actors. Thus the World Bank plays a major role in health policy ​because ​ it can 
frame health as an issue for developing economies. Here, however, we use frames in a new 
38 Notably ​Shiffman 2009, Labonté and Gagnon 2010​ , McInnes and Lee 2012. 
39 Reubi (2012), S176. 
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manner: to suggest that a health issue cannot be successfully constructed as a risk without 
framing it as a risk ​to something or to someone​ . Risks are therefore framed to resonate with 
particular communities who possess power in an attempt to generate action. Frames in global 
health are used both by advocates and actors, to persuade and to legitimate actions. Its utility 
as an analytical tool is in highlighting the material effects that changes in language may have in 
both limiting the range for ‘appropriate’ policy responses and in laying out a pathway into the 
future through institutionalisation.  It is also useful for us in highlighting that health is a political 
space in that:  framings are driven at least partly by strategic interests; that alternative - and 
sometimes competing - framings of health issues (can) exist; and that framings create winners 
and losers.  
 
We suggest that four frames relating to risk can be derived from the more general literature on 
framing for global health: 
● The biomedical frame is perhaps the most straightforward and longstanding, and is used 
to suggest that an issue is a risk to human health. In its narrowest sense, it focuses on 
the risk to the functioning of the human body from exposure to pathogens and toxins, but 
may also be scaled up to consider the risk to the physical and mental health of 
communities. Thus a highly pathogenic zoonotic virus such as H5N1 (avian influenza) 
has been successfully framed as a biomedical risk because of its high mortality rate 
(currently in excess of 50% of humans infected by poultry), but also because of the 
potential of a pandemic if the virus mutates to allow human-to-human transmission. 
● The rights frame is based not simply on the idea of a risk to ‘the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health’, articulated in the constitution of the WHO and 
subsequently developed in international law (including the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights in 1948), but on how ill-health may lead to discrimination. This has been 
particularly prominent in campaigns concerning HIV/AIDS and in tobacco control. AIDS 
activists from the 1980s on have fought against discriminatory practices affecting both 
individual people living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA), and communities which are 
perceived as being at high risk from HIV infection (notably the gay community, but also 
immigrants from countries with a high incidence of the disease). In contrast, while ‘big 
tobacco’ has argued that restrictions on tobacco use infringes the right of individuals to 
choose, advocates of tobacco control counter that smoking (including passive smoking) 
affects the right to health enshrined in the WHO constitution. 
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● The economics frame suggests that a health issue may be a risk to global economic 
growth or to development in low income economies. Arguments such as lost productivity 
due to worker absenteeism, reduced investment in areas where disease is endemic, 
formal restrictions or a general unwillingness to travel affecting both businesspeople and 
tourists,  and a lack of mobility in people moving to/from regions have all been deployed 
to suggest how economies may be affected by health issues and especially 
communicable diseases. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, for example, 
fears were commonly expressed that HIV represented an economic risk to fragile African 
states, potentially threatening their viability; while early assessments of the SARS 
outbreak in 2002-03 identified the economic costs in terms of tens of billions of dollars, 
feeding into ideas that newly emerging communicable diseases threatened global 
economic growth and were a risk not only to LICs but to high income states as well. 
● Finally health may be framed as a security risk, not least because of its effects on 
(inter)national stability. HIV for example has been presented as a risk to ‘the glue that 
holds societies together’ because of its effects on professional classes such as teachers, 
civil servants and the police; viruses such as smallpox have been identified as possible 
weapons for use by terrorists; epidemics threaten the social contract, where 
governments provide protection for their citizens; and new diseases, or diseases new to 
a region, may provoke widespread fear in society (as briefly occurred in 2015 when 
Thomas Edward Duncan was diagnosed with Ebola in the US). 
 
Framing Ebola as a global risk 
As an example of how these different frames are used, we explore three organizations central to 
the 2014-15 outbreak of Ebola in West Africa: the WHO, the international humanitarian NGO 
Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors without Borders (MSF) and the UN Security Council. Each of 
these organisations presented the risk from the outbreak in different ways, allowing them to 
construct different pathways for response. Predictably, the WHO framed the outbreak in 
biomedical terms. In her Report to the Special Session of the [WHO] Executive Board on Ebola 
in January 2015, for example, Director General Margaret Chan spoke of the outbreak in almost 
solely health terms. She  emphasised its size and complexity compared to previous outbreaks, 
the weakness of the public health infrastructure which allowed it to develop, the establishment 
of new laboratories to provide diagnoses, and the skill and bravery of health personnel in 
treating those infected. The risk presented was clearly to the lives and well-being of individuals 
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in West Africa.  This framing established a pathway for response based on established public 40
health and biomedical methodologies of surveillance, prevention of infection, controlling the 
spread of the disease and treatment of those affected. The WHO emphasised its role in 
assisting nearby states to prevent the spread of the disease; the need for improved health 
system functions to prevent new outbreaks of ebola from developing into crises; and its role in 
fast tracking the development of improved diagnostics and vaccines.  It was also sceptical over 41
the introduction of travel restrictions, ​not​  because of the potential economic impact (a common 
concern), but because of its potential to limit the number of aid workers being sent to West 
Africa. Nevertheless, the WHO did also deploy additional frames. In the opening paragraph of 
its Report to the January 2015 Special Session of the Executive Board on Ebola, the WHO 
Secretariat wrote that the outbreak ‘represents a threat to global health security’,  while for the 42
same meeting Margaret Chan wrote that ’what began as a health crisis quickly escalated into a 
humanitarian, social, economic and security crisis’.  The use of additional framings was also 43
evident in Chan’s September 2014 briefing to the UN Security Council. In this she deployed not 
only the security frame, talking of the risk of state failure, but she also deployed the economic 
frame, reiterating the World Bank’s warning of a ‘potentially catastrophic blow’ to economies in 
an already weak region.  The economic framing is also seen in other WHO documents, which 44
talk of the manner in which Ebola ‘devastated the health systems ​and​  economies [emphasis 
added]’ in West Africa,  and the manner in which health emergencies such as the Ebola 45
outbreak ‘can have long-term consequences that undermine decades of social development’.   46
 
In widening the framing of the Ebola outbreak beyond the biomedical, the WHO was legitimising 
the involvement of other actors rather than resisting. Whether this was a conscious strategy to 
gain wider support and assistance, or a reflection of the manner in which the crisis had 
developed is unclear. But it does stand in stark contrast to the framing presented by MSF, the 
other high-profile health actor involved. MSF consistently presented the Ebola crisis in 
biomedical terms, focusing on the nature and spread of the disease, and on the suffering of 
40 Margaret Chan, ‘Report by the Director General’. See also WHO, ‘Ebola virus disease’ and ‘WHO 
response’;; BBC, ‘WHO: Ebola “an international emergency”. 
41 See for example WHO, ‘Current context and challenges’, ‘Fast tracking’ and ‘Ensuring WHO’s capacity’ 
42 WHO, ‘Current context’, paragraph 1. 
43 Margaret Chan, Report by the Director General. 
44 UN, ‘Spread of Ebola’ 
45 WHO, ‘Building resilient health systems’, paragraph 1. 
46 WHO, ‘Ensuring WHO’s capacity’, paragraph 1. 
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patients. Although the use of the biomedical frame is hardly surprising, the heavy - almost total - 
focus on this frame is perhaps more so, given the potential utility of the rights and economic 
(especially economic development) frames for health provision. Given MSF’s historic wariness 
over working with militaries however, the avoidance of the security frame is perhaps more 
predictable.  
 
A typical example of MSFs biomedical framing is the short, high profile article posted on its 
website in June 2014. In this MSF makes the plea for additional resources. Dr Bart Janssens 
(MSF Head of Operations) is prominently quoted,  stating ‘The epidemic is out of control… there 
is a real risk of it spreading to other areas’. The focus is on the spread of the disease, the high 
numbers of cases, that MSF have ‘reached our limits’, and the need for additional medical and 
public health resources to bring it under control.  Two months later, in reaction to the WHO 47
declaring the outbreak a PHEIC, Janssens commented: 
Declaring Ebola an international public health emergency shows how 
seriously WHO is taking the current outbreak but statements won’t 
save lives. Now we need this statement to translate into immediate 
action on the ground. For weeks, MSF has been repeating that a 
massive medical, epidemiological and public health response is 
desperately needed to saves lives and reverse the course of the 
epidemic. Lives are being lost because the response is too slow. 
Countries possessing necessary capacities must immediately 
dispatch available infectious disease experts and disaster relief 
assets to the region. It is clear the epidemic will not be contained 
without a massive deployment on the ground from these states. In 
concrete terms, all of the following need to be radically scaled up: 
medical care, training of health staff, infection control, contact tracing, 
epidemiological surveillance, alert and referral systems, community 
mobilisation and education.  48
47 MSF, ‘Ebola in West Africa’. See also for example MSF, ‘Pushed to the limit’, ‘Guinea: Ebola epidemic’, 
‘Ebola: MSF response’, and ‘Ebola: after five months, where is the response?’. 
48 Quoted in MSF, ‘Ebola: official MSF response to the WHO declaring Ebola an international public health 
emergency’. 
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MSFs consistent use of a biomedical framing led to a clear pathway of response: ‘a massive 
deployment of medical and disaster relief specialists from states’.  When MSF’s International 49
President, Dr Joanne Liu, provided a special briefing for the UN, she similarly used the 
biomedical frame: 
Six months into the worst Ebola epidemic in history, the world is 
losing the battle to contain it. Leaders are failing to come to grips with 
this transnational threat. In West Africa, cases and deaths continue 
to surge. Riots are breaking out. Isolation centers are overwhelmed. 
Health workers on the front lines are becoming infected and are 
dying in shocking numbers. Others have fled in fear, leaving people 
without care for even the most common illnesses. Entire health 
systems have crumbled. Ebola treatment centers are reduced to 
places where people go to die alone, where little more than palliative 
care is offered. It is impossible to keep up with the sheer number of 
infected people pouring into facilities. In Sierra Leone, infectious 
bodies are rotting in the streets. Rather than building new Ebola care 
centers in Liberia, we are forced to build crematoria.  50
This led to her identifying and discussing a particular pathway of response based on prevention, 
containment and treatment. Most notably, she departed from MSF’s traditional aversion to 
working with military’s to ask for military aid. However, this was ​within​  the biomedical frame and 
its identified pathway of response, rather than an attempt to securitise the outbreak: 
Many of the Member states represented here today have invested 
heavily in biological threat response. You have a political and 
humanitarian responsibility to immediately utilize these capabilities in 
Ebola-affected countries. To curb the epidemic, it is imperative that 
States immediately deploy civilian and military assets with expertise 
in biohazard containment. I call upon you to dispatch your disaster 
response teams, backed by the full weight of your logistical 
capabilities.  51
 
49 MSF, ‘International response’. See also MSF, ‘Guinea: Ebola epidemic’  
50 Liu, ‘UN special briefing’ 
51 Liu, ‘UN special briefing’ 
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Unlike the WHO and MSF, whose organisational focus was on health, the UN Security Council 
had only occasionally intervened on health issues. Its most notable health interventions prior to 
the Ebola outbreak concerned HIV, including UNSC Resolution 1308 (which concerned the 
impact of HIV on peacekeeping).  In September 2014 however, in under a week, it passed two 52
Resolutions concerning the Ebola outbreak, both following discussions in the Council. The first, 
Resolution 2176 of 15 September, expressed the Council’s ‘grave concern’ over the outbreak 
and extended the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia (UNMIL, authorised under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter) until 31 December 2014. Significantly the Council determined the outbreak to 
be ‘that the situation in Liberia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
stability in the region’, effectively securitising the outbreak.  The second, longer Resolution 53
followed an extended (but consensual) discussion in the Council on 18 September. This 
discussion included briefings from amongst others Margaret Chan, David Nabarro (Senior UN 
System Coordinator for Ebola) and Jackson KP Niamah from MSF. The Council reiterated its 
position that the ‘unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constituted a threat to 
international peace and security’, a security framing which was consistently used during the 
Council’s discussion and in the subsequent Resolution 2177.  In particular the risk of state 54
failure was alluded to when several Council members noted the fragile and vulnerable condition 
of affected countries, a point reiterated in Resolution 2177 which recognised  
that the peacebuilding and development gains of the most affected 
countries concerned could be reversed in light of the Ebola outbreak and 
underlin[ed] that the outbreak is undermining stability of the most affected 
countries concerned and, unless contained, may lead to further instances 
of civil unrest, social tensions and a deterioration of the political and 
security climate.  55
52 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1308, 17 July 2000. Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1308(2000)  
53 UNSC Resolution 2176, 15 September 2014. Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2014.shtml  
54 UNSC Resolution 2177, 18 September 2014. Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2014.shtml​; Minutes of the United Nations Security Council 
7268th Meeting, S/PV.7268, 18 September 2014, available at 
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2014​. For a summary of the discussion see UN Meetings 
Coverage: Security Council, ‘With Spread of Ebola Outpacing Response, Security Council Adopts 
Resolution 2177 (2014) Urging Immediate Action, End to Isolation of Affected States’ available at 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11566.doc.htm  
 
55 UNSC Resolution 2177. 
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Although the security framing dominated both the discussion in the Council and its two 
Resolutions, legitimising the deployment of military forces to assist in the region, other framings 
were also used.  These allowed the Council to develop a pathway of response which 
emphasised collaboration between not only elements of the UN system, but those states able to 
provide aid. Resolution 2177 for example ‘stress[es] the need for coordinated efforts of all 
relevant United Nations System entities to address the Ebola outbreak’. , while Secretary 56
General Ban Ki-Moon’s opening comments in the Council debate drew on multiple frames to 
portray the outbreak as a ‘complex emergency’ requiring coordinated response.   The 57
economic frame was used by a number of those participating in the debate,  with Resolution 58
2177 also noting the risk to economies, including the risk posed by travel restrictions;  the 59
rights frame was deployed, with the Council noting in particular the impact on women and the 
humanitarian dimensions of the outbreak;  while multiple contributions (including those from all 60
P5 Representatives) referred to the outbreak as a health crisis (though often as ‘more than’ a 
health crisis).  Interestingly, Resolution 2177 linked both health and security by referring to the 61
Global Health Security Agenda, allowing it to include public health measures in its pathway of 
response.  62
 
Conclusion 
The rise of global health on the international political agenda has been accompanied with rise of 
global health ​politics. ​ Yet, there is an uneasy relationship between the two because public 
health has traditionally been considered a largely technical, scientific field that operates largely 
on the basis of positivist rationalities. Moreover, in the global arena, where cooperation and 
collective action is difficult to enforce, political conflict can be seen as particularly problematic for 
the pursuit of public goods such as improved health. We illustrate the uneasy relationship 
between global health and politics through the lense of framing analysis.  
 
56 UNSC Resolution 2177, p.3.  
57 Minutes of UNSC 7268th meeting, p.2.  
58 See for example the contributions made by Representatives from Australia and Chad, available in the 
Minutes of UNSC 7268th Meeting, pp. 16 and 19. 
59 UNSC Resolution 2177, pp.1-2. 
60 For example, Resolution 2177, pp.1 and 2. 
61 Minutes of UNSC 7268th meeting.  
62 UNSC Resolution 2177, p.2. 
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In the first part of the paper, we show how the framing of infectious disease pandemics as a 
global risk creates a certain perception of the policy problem at hand: how to respond to a future 
event that is potentially catastrophic, yet unpredictable and unavoidable? Furthermore, we show 
how this framing also has material consequences in that promotes a policy response of various 
preparedness initiatives, programs and institutions. We argue that the global risk frame is 
inherently political in that its material consequences benefit populations in wealthy countries 
more than those in poor countries and therefore privilege the interests of the former of those of 
the latter. At the same time, however, the frame is particularly conducive to diffusing political 
conflict. First, it combines a sense of urgency - derived from its focus on potential catastrophe - 
with the suggestion that measures can be taken to mitigate or even prevent disaster. In this 
situation, is difficult to oppose those measures without seeming negligent. Second, the global 
risk frame can help diffuse politics because of its neutral, almost scientific tone. It also promotes 
a sense of inclusiveness by articulating the potentially catastrophic impact of pandemics in 
global terms - as global loss of lives, damage to the global economy, and the global spread of 
disease. In other words, be creating a moral imperative to act and a sense of inclusiveness the 
global risk frame can help diffuse political argument about where the benefits and costs of 
preparedness policies lie.  
 
In the second part of the paper, we illustrate the difficult relationship between global health and 
politics by looking at how different organisations involved in the international response to a 
recent infectious disease outbreak, Ebola, framed the problem in different ways and, 
consequently, advocated different pathways of response. This opens up the possibility of 
competition and contestation, where there is no scientifically valid optimal response but rather a 
clash of interests and values each of which are legitimate from perspective of the particular 
frame used. The significance of what we are arguing therefore is that global health has opened 
up the requirement for a greater political sensitivity. Politics is inherent in global health, and 
needs to be accommodated rather than avoided. 
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